The Department of Energy (DOE) uses the metric Cost-of-Energy (COE) to assess the financial viability of renewable energy technologies and make policy decisions. Current wind farm research focuses on decreasing COE by reducing hardware costs and optimizing turbine layouts. The hardware costs have detailed sub-models in the DOE's estimation of COE. Non-hardware costs, termed soft costs, make up approximately 21% of total cost for a land-based farm, yet are only represented with general assumptions. This work removes these assumptions and replaces them with a probabilistic model of the costs of land lease and noise disturbance compensation, which is incorporated into a wind-farm-layoutoptimization-under-uncertainty system model. The system-level model was tested on farmland with 22 landowners and 12 residences. It includes the realistic constraint that all landowners are offered the same compensation structure, even though they have different profiles. Thus, the optimization must determine whether or not to include "expensive" landowners with access to excellent wind resource but, if included, will increase the compensation package for all. The model predicts COEs remarkably close to real-world costs. Wind energy policy-makers can use this model to promote new areas of soft-costfocused research.
Introduction
The Department of Energy (DOE) promotes research and policies that investigate alternative renewable energy technologies to alleviate U.S. dependency on coal, oil, and natural gas (Office of Energy Efficiency and Reneable Energy, 2015a). Cost-Of-Energy (COE), or MWH of annualized cost divided by energy output per year, offers a universal metric to compare the competitiveness of different power-generation approaches (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). By far, the majority of research in renewable energy technology focuses on decreasing COE to a level comparable with traditional fuel sources, via improvements in technology and/or hardware-related costs. Recently, the DOE has initiated programs that aim to reduce the soft costs of renewable energy. For example, the SunShot Initiative (Office of Energy Efficient and Renewable Energy, 2015b), which aims to make solar energy cost-competitive with other forms of energy by the end of the decade, collaborates with industry and research institutes to reduce soft costs for residential solar power installation. In just four years, this program has funded more than 350 projects to make the solar energy resources more affordable and accessible for Americans.
Wind energy soft costs, even though they amount to approximately 21% of a wind farm's annualized costs, have received much less research attention. This paper offers a detailed investigation and modeling of two major soft costs in wind farm projects: the costs of landowner acquisition (land lease costs) as discussed in the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) , and noise disturbance compensation-a new contribution of this work, explained in detail in Section 2.2.
In the early-development stages of commercial wind projects, developers approach landowners for permission to build turbines on their land in exchange for monetary compensation. In a large-scale farmland project, developers can approach over 100 individual landowners. Developers must make important and expensive decisions, such as placing equipment orders or obtaining funding from potential project backers, with limited and uncertain information of these factors. Much of this uncertainty stems from unknown landowner participation. At the same time, landowners must decide whether or not to participate in the project without knowing the turbine locations and the potential impacts.
Both stakeholders, developers and landowners, face high levels of risk.
It is customary for developers to offer all landowners the same compensation package, with many unknowns. For example, developers offer landowners a certain dollar compensation per MW installed per year, but do not specify how many MW will be installed on their land. They will offer particular riders for other disturbances, such as dollar per decibel-level-range noise disturbance and dollar per unit of road built, but do not specify the level of noise or amount of road construction. The agreement also does not specify turbine location on land parcels, or number of turbines. Therefore, it is difficult for landowners to assess compensation packages. Clearly, both stakeholders would benefit from increased information in early-stage farm development. This could decrease both development time, via more-transparent negotiations, and COE, via addressing uncertainty in planning.
This paper uses an optimization-under-uncertainty framework developed previously by the authors (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) , to specifically address two major soft-cost challenges: (a) determine land lease terms for all participating landowners and (b) determine noise disturbance compensation. The robust design optimization problem has two objectives for the farm's COE: minimize the normalized mean value and standard deviation. The authors use probability theory to model the uncertain parameters, Latin Hypercube Sampling to propagate the uncertainty throughout the COE system model, and compromise programming to solve the multi-objective optimization problem. The system model provided in this paper can help developers identify plots of land that are worth the extra investment, and provide a robust wind farm design that is not only profitable but also has minimal noise disturbance for landowners. It can also give landowners an idea of where turbines are likely to be placed on their land, and the likely auditory impacts. Figure 1represents the overview of the COE system model used in this work. Five models are used to calculate the COE: a noise propagation model (introduced in detail in Section 2.2.4), an enhanced cost model developed based on the Wind Turbine Design Cost and Scaling Model (Fingersh et al., 2006) by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the Turbine System Cost Report from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Bolinger and Wise, 2011) , a wind shear model (Ray et al., 2006 ), Jensen's (1983) wake loss model, and a power model for a GE turbine (Archer and Jacobson, 2007) . The latter four models are discussed thoroughly in the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013 ). The cost model here has the additional constraint of equal compensation structures for all participating landowners and eliminates the unnecessary economies-ofscale cost reduction coefficient, as explained later in this section.
Methods

System model overview
The model includes four sources of uncertainty, indicated in gray in Figure 1 . Wind condition is modeled as aleatory uncertainty using a wind rose, shown in detail in section 2.3.2. Three epistemic sources of uncertainty are modeled in this paper: wind shear, same as in previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) ; landowner participation, with more detail given in previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) and Section 2.3.3; and monetary compensation required for a given noise disturbance, as represented by a Willingness-to-Accept-Noise utility model, explained later in Section 2.2.3. There are multiple sources of uncertainty within the noise propagation model, but they are self-contained and not detailed here.
The COE system model includes the constraint of equal compensation structure for all participating landowners. In wind farm projects, landowners are sellers and developers are buyers. Within the model, in order for a landowner to accept the developer's compensation offer, the landowner's utility of having turbines plus the associated compensation must be greater than or equal to the utility of not having turbines and not having that compensation. In our previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) , an uncertain parameter-Willingness-to-Accept for participation ( p WTA ), is introduced to model landowner participation decisions as utility functions. The work assumes that the developers pay each landowner the exact compensation that they are personally willing to accept. While this is useful for the conclusions drawn in previous work, it is not realistic enough for a detailed soft costs model. In reality, instead of individual negotiations, which would increase the project timeline and cost, developers prefer to offer all landowners the same compensation structure, namely a certain dollar per MWh with riders to cover additional damage. Landowners with good wind resource but more expensive compensation demands may increase compensation for all, as developers work to ensure their participation. However, there is a breaking point at which even wind- Another improvement of the model in this paper is the elimination of the economiesof-scale turbine cost reduction coefficient. This coefficient is included in many layout optimization studies (DuPont and Cagan, 2012; Grady et al., 2005; Marmidis, et al., 2008; Mosetti et al., 1994) , but underestimates costs. The optimal COE in the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) ranged from USD 42 -48 per MWh, about 10 USD lower than the real industry data. To investigate the impact of the cost reduction coefficient on optimal COE, the authors conducted an optimization analysis for a portion of the Story County Wind Farm (Wikipedia, 2013) , varying the number of turbines.
The result shows the optimal COE without cost reduction is closer to the real industry data of USD 51 -57 per MWh. In addition, when the number of turbines increases, the advantage of removing cost reduction is more obvious, as shown in Figure 2 . Therefore, the authors removed the cost reduction formulation in the system model proposed in this paper.
Probabilistically modeling acceptance of noise
When placing wind turbines near residential locations, noise impact becomes a primary concern for landowners. The noise at a residential home depends on the distance between the home and the surrounding turbines. A qualitative analysis conducted by Groth and Vogt (2014) shows noise disturbance is one of the most commonly-stated negative perceptions of wind energy development. People do not like to hear wind turbines, and different people have different perceptions of it (Pedersen and Waye, 2007) . Developers receive complaints and lawsuits about excessive noise and its associated adverse health impacts (Ambrose and Rand, 2013) . For example, an Oregon landowner claimed he was suffering "emotional distress, deteriorating physical and emotional health, dizziness, inability to sleep, drowsiness, fatigue, headaches, difficulty thinking, irritation and lethargy" due to the wind turbine noise (The Associated Press, 2013) and recently filed a related $5 million lawsuit. In practice, if the noise disturbance is above a certain decibel (dB) level, homeowners receive an annual compensation amount of up to $1500 in total from developers (Mosman, 2015; Muschell, 2015) . Landowners argue for safer guidelines in the siting of wind turbines, as they are uncertain of the associated health risks of noise disturbance (Songsore and Buzzelli, 2014) .
If developers can guarantee the noise below a certain limit or give landowners an idea of the likely auditory impact, the landowners are more likely to accept the contract. Therefore, it is important to carefully model noise impact in the wind farm layout optimization problem. Current wind farm layout optimization research sets noise disturbance as a constraint or an objective function (Fagerfja ll, 2010; Kwong et al., 2012) .
No existing research models monetary compensation for noise disturbance. This section addresses this limitation by modeling the landowners' acceptance of noise probabilistically, in combination with a constraint on maximum noise disturbance. The model is built from existing research. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 detail documentation on community reactions to noise that we used to create landowner acceptance profiles. The full Willingness-to-AcceptNoise model is developed in Section 2.2.3, while Section 2.2.4 provides the Noise Propagation Model used in this paper.
Community reaction to different noise levels
Ambrose and Rand (2013) summarized a variety of studies on the community reaction to different noise levels. The results of these studies were plotted in a single chart to identify noise level ranges for different community reactions, as show in Table 1 . The chart indicates that people will not react adversely to a noise level below 29 dB, but will strongly oppose a noise level above 43 dB (about as loud as a refrigerator). Therefore, our optimization formulation sets 43 dB as a hard constraint, i.e. the program guarantees that noise levels for all residential locations are less than 43 dB. The model proposes: (1) if the noise level is below 29 dB, landowners will not receive any compensation; and (2) if the noise level is between 29 dB and 43 dB, landowners will receive compensation of up to $1500 per year-a typical amount offered by developers as compensation for noise disturbance (Mosman, 2015; Muschell, 2015) . Note again that solution will not include noise levels above 43 dB.
Landowner noise perception types
To be able to model uncertainty, landowners are divided into three theoretically possible types depending on their perception of the 43 dB turbine noise: (1) Type-1 landowners: do not notice the turbine noise of 43 dB and thus are not annoyed (10%); (2) Type-2 landowners: notice the turbine noise of 43 dB, but do not feel annoyed (75%); and (3) Type-3 landowners: notice the turbine noise of 43 dB and do feel annoyed (15%). Our model's representation of perception of noise at levels lower than 43 dB is explained in Section 2.2.3. Note that the landowner types for noise perception are distinct from the landowner land lease acceptance profiles, as discussed in the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) and later in Section 2.3.3. Each landowner will have a different profile for noise and lease acceptance.
The percentage of each type is based on a cross-sectional study conducted by Pedersen and Waye (2007) , which evaluated the perception and annoyance of wind turbine noise among people living near the turbines. 754 subjects completed a postal questionnaire regarding living conditions, including response to wind turbine noise. The outdoor noise level for each respondent was calculated separately. Pedersen and Waye discovered that when turbine noise is around 40 dB, 90% of respondents can notice the noise and 15% of respondents feel annoyed. Therefore, 75% of respondents can notice the noise but do not feel annoyed. This result is in line with Ambrose and R. Rand's study (2013), which asserts that there are only complaints, not strong appeals, when the turbine noise is less than 43 dB. As most of the landowners are not annoyed by turbine noise around 40 dB, they do not make strong appeals to stop the noise. When the turbine noise is above 43 dB, more landowners feel annoyed. Community action might be initiated at this time. More landowners get together to discuss the adverse impacts of turbine noise, which could influence the landowners who do not feel annoyed, which results in wider appeals to reduce the noise.
Willingness-to-Accept-Noise utility model
In order for the landowners to be willing to accept noise compensation, the utility of hearing noise plus the associated compensation must be greater than or equal to the utility of not hearing noise and not receiving compensation. We define 43 , n WTA as the minimum annual payment that a landowner is willing to accept to compensate for the noise level of 43 dB:
where U is a landowner's utility function, WTA is set to be between $0 and $1500 per year, which is the typical compensation range offered by developers (Mosman, 2015; Muschell, 2015) . Landowners are classified into three types, each with their own uncertain 43 , n WTA , as shown in Table 2. (1) Type-1 landowners, as discussed above, cannot notice the turbine noise of 43 dB. Therefore, the 43 , n WTA per year is most likely to be between $0 and $500 (probability = 0.7) and between $500 and $1000 (probability = 0.3); (2) Type-2 landowners can notice the turbine noise of 43 dB, but do not feel annoyed. Therefore, the 43 , n WTA per year is equally likely to be between $0 and $500 (probability = 0.5) and between $500 and $1000 (probability = 0.5);
(3) Type-3 landowners feel annoyed at turbine noise of 43 dB. Therefore, the 43 , n WTA per year is most likely to be between $1000 and $1500 (probability = 0.7) and $500 and $1000 (probability = 0.3). These probabilities and other characteristics of the landowner profiles are determined by the authors from literature, but in practice can be replaced with any numbers that developers or researchers see fit.
Given the 
is the landowner's minimum WTA amount in $/yr for a noise
AT L is real receiver noise level in dB at the landowner's house, calculated using the Noise Propagation Model described in Section 2.2.4; 43 , n WTA is the given WTA amount ($/yr) of the landowner for a 43 dB noise.
As discussed above, when the noise level is below 29 dB, landowners will have no reaction according to Ambrose and Rand (2013) 
is set to be 0 when AT L is below 29 dB, indicating landowners are willing to accept a noise level below 29 dB without compensation. However, when the noise level is above 43 dB, landowners will have strong appeals to stop noise (Ambrose and Rand, 2013 (2) with this most-costly WTA, and calculates the final noise compensation for each landowner based on the noise heard at their home.
Noise propagation model
The noise propagation model used here is based on ISO 9613-2 (1996): 
Here W L represents the octave-band sound power level for the noise source (turbine), C D is the directivity correction, which is neglected in this work, and the octave-band attenuation A is defined as the sum:
where div A is the attenuation due to geometrical divergence (spreading of sound waves in 3D space), defined as
where d is the distance from the source to receiver and 0 d is the reference distance (1m).
The attenuation due to atmospheric absorption ( atm A ) is calculated as: 
The detailed method for calculating attenuations with regard to source region ( landowners, and most own multiple land parcels. Figure 3shows the test area; black lines outline the individual land parcels, each parcel is labeled by landowner id (1 to 22), followed by a parcel counter. For example, 9-1 indicates the first parcel owned by landowner 9, 9-2 the second parcel owned by landowner 9, etc. Note that all parcels owned by the same landowner will have same WTA profiles for participation and noise. Note also that not all parcels owned by the same landowner are adjacent to each other, for example see the parcels of landowners 13 and 14.
The system model presented in this section allows for 100 potential locations for turbines, as indicated by the white circles in Figure 3 . The distance between any two potential locations is set to be more than four rotor diameters to reduce wake interactions, a typical setting in wind farm layout optimization literature (Ozturk and Norman, 2004; Kusiak and Song, 2010) . Section 3.2 modifies the formulation with more potential locations to investigate a higher-resolution solution space.
Wind condition of the test area
The authors used the actual one-year wind data of 2011 from the Iowa Environmental Mesonet (2013a) website to model the wind condition of the test area. thorough reviews on a variety of wind models, and found out Weibull distribution was able to fit most wind data well. The authors also proved in previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) that Weibull distribution can fit the wind data of Iowa well.
Equation (9) provides the Probability Density Function (PDF) of Weibull Distribution (Lackner and Elkinton, 2007) , which defines wind speed v as a function depending on the shape factor k and the scale factor  . More details of this wind model can be found in the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) .
Distribution of landowner types for lease acceptance and noise perception
In the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2013) , the authors summarized wind project easement and lease data from published sources (Windustry, 2009) , and found out the compensation per MW installed per year for landowners typically ranged from $1000 to $5000 with a mean value of $2757. To model the uncertainty associated with land lease compensation, the authors took into account an uncertain p WTA in previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) and $2500 (probability = 0.5) and between $2500 and $5000 (probability = 0.5); (2) Type-B landowners will accept moderate compensation. The p WTA is more likely to be between $2500 and $5000 (probability = 0.7); (3) Type-C landowners will accept high or moderate compensation. The p WTA is equally likely to be between $2500 and $5000 (probability = 0.5) and between $5000 and $50000 (probability = 0.5); and (4) Type-D landowners will only accept high compensation. The p WTA is more likely to be between $5000 and $50000 (probability = 0.7). Note that, it is assumed here that the probabilities are estimated from a hypothetic developer. In practice, the probabilities will be estimated by a real site developer through his/her interactions with landowners. Landowners 1-22 were then randomly assigned to a type, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 5 , similar as the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015, 2013) . In practice, a site developer will assign each landowner a type based on their personal interactions (meetings, phone calls, E-mails, and etc.). Figure 5 shows the location of the twelve houses, owned by 9 landowners, used as the noise receivers in this paper. In Figure 5 , the central location of each house is marked with a small house symbol. Homeowners/landowners are modeled with three noise perception profiles, i.e. uncertain Table 2 . Based on the study conducted by Pedersen and Waye (2007) , as discussed in Section 2.2.2, the percentages for Type-1, Type-2, and Type-3 landowners are 10%, 75%, and 15% respectively. Therefore, the formulation assumes one type-1 landowner, seven type-2 landowners, and one type-3 landowner. These types are assigned randomly, and the houses are shaded by type in Figure 5. 
Objective function
The objective for the deterministic system model is to minimize the COE given the environmental parameters P and a fixed number of turbines (16 turbines for the selected piece of land), defined as:
subject to:
where   P X COE , is the levelized cost of energy of the wind farm in $/MWh, as detailed in the authors' previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015 X is a 100-bit binary string design variable representing the potential turbine locations shown in Figure 3 . The equality constraint  
X h
indicates that the total number of turbines selected by the optimization program will be fixed at 16. This number is selected based on the actual number of turbines within the test area. In practice, it is straightforward to modify this number to meet the developers' needs.
Results and discussion
100 potential turbine locations
GAlib, a library of genetic algorithms (GAs) developed by Wall (1999) , was used to solve the optimization problem in C++. GA is a widely-used heuristic probabilistic search algorithm (Grady et al., 2005) , which does not require a differentiable objective function and are less likely to get trapped in a local optimum (Houck et al., 1995; Davis, 1991) . The authors decided to use GA as: (1) the design variable in this work is a binary string; (2) the objective function is non-differentiable; and (3) it is likely to have more than one optimal layout (multi-modal).
This paper used a penalty function for constraint violation, similar as in previous work (Chen, 2013; Chen and MacDonald, 2015 , to address the equality constraint of Equation (11 For each scenario, the program ran over ten times with 10,000 iterations each time.
The best results of these ten runs are shown in Table 5 . The noise levels for the houses ranged from 34 dB to almost 43 dB, as shown in Figure 6 .
As shown in Table 5 , all three scenarios have very similar COEs (around 52.5 $/MWh) with the same standard deviation (5.08 $/MWh). A similar finding is discussed in the authors' previous work (Chen and MacDonald, 2015) indicating that the variance of COE is mainly the result of changing the number of turbines in the problem set-up. Minimizing In the results of Scenario 3 (Figure 6 ), houses and both receive the highest noise level, 43 dB, while house receives the lowest. As shown in Figure 6 , house is owned by a Type-1 landowner, who does not hear the turbine noise of 43 dB. The noise level for this house is one of the highest because the associated payment to the landowner is low. On the contrary, house is owned by a Type-3 landowner, who will feel annoyed at turbine noise of 43 dB. To reduce compensation cost for noise disturbance, the noise level of house should be minimized. However, house is located at the boundary of the entire land plot, which is favored by the optimization program to minimize wake losses (Barthelmie, 2006) . Therefore, the optimization program does not avoid placing turbines around house , as the turbine location benefits outweigh the required extra compensation for noise disturbance.
On the other hand, house , which is also located at the boundary of the entire land plot, receives the lowest noise level. This is because house is surrounded by a Type-D landowner (shaded by yellow), who has the highest remittance requirement for participating in the project (see Section 2.3.2 above). If turbines are placed on the land of a Type-D landowner, all the other landowners would have to receive the same high remittance fees package. Therefore, to save on the overall remittance fees for participation, no turbines are placed around house , which results in the lowest noise level of house .
Similarly, none of the three scenarios placed any turbines on the land of other type-D landowners (parcels shaded by yellow), in order to keep overall remittance fees down.
Improved results with higher resolution solution space
This section reinvestigates Scenario 1, minimizing the mean COE, using a higherresolution solution space with 576 (24 by 24) potential turbine locations (Figure 7) . The algorithm used the optimal turbine locations found in Section 3.1 as the initial points for the GA. The improved optimal results are summarized in Table 6 
Conclusion and policy implications
This paper incorporates two important soft costs, the cost of landowner acquisition (land lease remittances) and the costs for compensating landowners for noise disturbance, into the wind farm layout optimization problem. It improves on previous research, which takes into account landowners' lease acceptance types, and develops an uncertain
Willingness-to-Accept-Noise model to represent the minimum amount of annual payment that a landowner is willing to accept for a given noise level. The new system model was tested with different scenarios using realistic data from a 2 by 2 mile plot of an Iowa windfarm containing 22 landowners and 12 noise receivers (houses). Initially using 100 potential turbine locations, the optimal mean COE value created by the model ranges from $52 to $53 per MWh (Table 5) , which matches the observed COE industry data ($51 to $57 per MWh).
Unlike the Wind Turbine Design Cost and Scaling Model developed by NREL (Fingersh et al., 2006) , that use a single number to represent land lease cost, the model presented here predicts a realistic COE through the incorporation of landowners' decisions, concerns, and probabilistic models of associated soft costs. While the model presented here offers reasonable compensation values and provides useful design suggestions to landowners and developers during early-stage farm negotiations, it does have a few limitations that will require further input for it to be useful in the field. In this paper, the estimations of uncertain parameters are all based on assumptions rather than on measured values, for example, the dollar compensation values in the landowner noise-acceptance profiles. For implementation, it would be best to conduct interviews with developers and landowners to fine-tune these parameters.
Additionally, different types and sources of uncertainty could be added, such as those associated with turbine failure. The noise propagation model used in the work (ISO 9613-2, 1996 ) is the industry standard, however it is fairly rudimentary. Higher-fidelity noise models, such as CONCAWE, could be included in the future to further validate the results.
Similarly, a higher-fidelity wake loss model could also be used.
The noise output and the optimal layout shown in Figure 6 indicates that the importance of landowners to the outcome of the project depends on the wind resource their parcels provide, their lease-acceptance profile, and their noise-acceptance profile. Of these factors, lease acceptance (which has an uncertain range from $1000 to $50000 per MW installed per year as shown in Table 3 ) plays a particularly important role -as can be seen in Figure 6 , all optimal layouts avoid placing turbines on parcels owned by the landowners that demand the most compensation, type-D and type-C landowners. Noise acceptance plays a less important role in determining crucial landowners, because the compensation for noise annoyance has a much smaller impact on overall farm COE. For example, Figure 6 shows that the noise level of house is at the highest level (43 dB), although it is owned by a landowner with a high noise compensation request, indicating that the location benefit of house outweighs the required additional noise compensation.
The results indicate that minimizing COE Type-B Landowners 1, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 16, and 22 Type-C Landowners 2, 7, 13, 17, and 21
Type-D Landowners 8, 10, and 20 Figure 2 Relationship between the optimal COE and the number of turbines. 
